Chomsky: "Let me begin by referring to something that we have already discussed, that is, if it is correct, as I believe it is, that a fundamental element of human nature is the need for creative work, for creative inquiry, for free creation without the arbitrary limiting effect of coercive institutions, then, of course, it will follow that a decent society should maximise the possibilities for this fundamental human characteristic to be realised. That means trying to overcome the elements of repression and oppression and destruction and coercion that exist in any existing society, ours for example, as a historical residue.
Now any form of coercion or repression, any form of autocratic control of some domain of existence, let's say, private ownership of capital or state control of some aspects of human life, any such autocratic restriction on some area of human endeavour, can be justified, if at all, only in terms of the need for subsistence, or the need for survival, or the need for defence against some horrible fate or something of that sort. It cannot be justified intrinsically. Rather it must be overcome and eliminated."
One form of coercion or repression that Chomsky could be referring to is government protection of the right to private property, as opposed to merely possession. As I understand it, most Libertarians and Catholics would justify this government protection as a natural right, saying that human flourishing can only be achieved if such a right is protected by some institution. If not government, anarcho-capitalists would suggest what they call PDAs, Private Defense Associations, which would do the job of protecting, by force if necessary, private property. It seems that Chomsky would argue that such forcible protection, whether by government or by private institution, is intrinsically unjust and can only be justified if necessary for human life as opposed to that which Libertarians and Catholics would call human flourishing. The question, for me, is does forcible protection of private property systematically protect or oppress human life? On an individual basis, if we stick to the definition of property as objects that are not being used for the livelihood of the owner himself, then I must admit that forcible protection of such property could be arguably unjust and oppressive in a great many cases.
Foucault: "When you asked me why I was interested in politics, I refused to answer because it seemed evident to me, but perhaps your question was: How am I interested in it?
And had you asked me that question, and in a certain sense I could say you have, I would say to you that I am much less advanced in my way; I go much less far than Mr. Chomsky. That is to say that I admit to not being able to define, nor for even stronger reasons to propose, an ideal social model for the functioning of our scientific or technological society...
"It seems to me that the real political task in a society such as ours is to criticise the workings of institutions, which appear to be both neutral and independent; to criticise and attack them in such a manner that the political violence which has always exercised itself obscurely through them will be unmasked, so that one can fight against them."
Chomsky: Those are the basic institutions of oppression and coercion and autocratic rule that appear to be neutral despite everything they say: well, we're subject to the democracy of the market place, and that must be understood precisely in terms of their autocratic power, including the particular form of autocratic control that comes from the domination of market forces in an inegalitarian society.
Surely we must understand these facts, and not only understand them but combat them. And in fact, as far as one's own political involvements are concerned, in which one spends the majority of one's energy and effort, it seems to me that they must certainly be in that area. I don't want to get personal about it, but my own certainly are in that area, and I assume everyone's are. (He says later that 'to a very large extent existing law represents certain human values, which are decent human values; and existing law, correctly interpreted, permits much of what the state commands you not to do. And I think it's important to exploit [that] fact'.)
They both suggest the noble cause of criticizing institutions of oppression, even if they act only in response to market demand. Blindly following market demand can lead to something like tyranny of the majority, because, as Chomsky says, market forces cannot necessarily be left uncriticised in an egalitarian society. If a powerful institution, such as, for example, a factory farming operation, seems to be operating contrary to human values, then we should unmask it and fight against it, through just means of course.
Still, I think it would be a great shame to put aside entirely the somewhat more abstract and philosophical task of trying to draw the connections between a concept of human nature that gives full scope to freedom and dignity and creativity and other fundamental human characteristics, and to relate that to some notion of social structure in which those properties could be realised and in which meaningful human life could take place."
Foucault: "The universalisation of the model of the bourgeois has been the utopia which has animated the constitution of Soviet society.
The result is that you too realised, I think, that it is difficult to say exactly what human nature is.
Isn't there a risk that we will be led into error?"
Chomsky: "Well, you see, I think that in the intellectual domain of political action, that is the domain of trying to construct a vision of a just and free society on the basis of some notion of human nature, we face the very same problem that we face in immediate political action, namely, that of being impelled to do something, because the problems are so great, and yet knowing that whatever we do is on the basis of a very partial understanding of the social realities, and the human realities in this case...
"Yet at the same time it is of critical importance that we know what impossible goals we're trying to achieve, if we hope to achieve some of the possible goals. And that means that we have to be bold enough to speculate and create social theories on the basis of partial knowledge, while remaining very open to the strong possibility, and in fact overwhelming probability, that at least in some respects we're very far off the mark."
I cannot just fight against something I perceive as injustice without making an effort to explain how it could be just. For example, I will not say that the system of capitalism is inherently unjust (though Chomsky would disagree), only that it allows for injustice to systematically occur through pursuit of profit alone without regard to possible human consequences. I believe that it is up to all citizens to watch for 'market forces' that act out of line with human values, and that it is up to those who learn of undesirable effects to make those effects known. Only through vigilance and public discussion can market forces 'align' for the good - something that is completely possible under a capitalist system.
Foucault: "Are you committing this act in virtue of an ideal justice, or because the class struggle makes it useful and necessary? Do you refer to ideal justice, that's my problem."
Chomsky: "Take international law, a very weak instrument as we know, but nevertheless one that incorporates some very interesting principles. Well, international law is, in many respects, the instrument of the powerful : it is a creation of states and their representatives. In developing the presently existing body of international law, there was no participation by mass movements of peasants. The structure of international law reflects that fact; that is, international law permits much too wide a range of forceful intervention in support of existing power structures that define themselves as states against the interests of masses of people who happen to be organised in opposition to states.
Whatever is just should be able to be universally agreed upon. The trouble is that I don't think we could ever all agree on a just system. A just system cannot force individuals to be just. This means that injustice will inevitably continue and there will always be victims of such injustice that blame the system, even if it is in fact the best possible system. The cause of the powerless against the powerful is not always a just one.
That said, it is true that laws are often written by the powerful and can be used to avoid the justice question, which is in itself a crime. Those organized in opposition to states must be given a chance to explain their case.
Now that's a fundamental defect of international law and I think one is justified in opposing that aspect of international law as having no validity, as having no more validity than the divine right of kings. It's simply an instrument of the powerful to retain their power."
Foucault: "So it is in the name of a purer justice that you criticise the functioning of justice?"
Chomsky: "Yeah, but surely you believe that your role in the war is a just role, that you are fighting a just war, to bring in a concept from another domain. And that, I think, is important. If you thought that you were fighting an unjust war, you couldn't follow that line of reasoning."
Foucault: "I would like to reply to you in terms of Spinoza and say that the proletariat doesn't wage war against the ruling class because it considers such a war to be just. The proletariat makes war with the ruling class because, for the first time in history, it wants to take power. And because it will overthrow the power of the ruling class it considers such a war to be just... One makes war to win war, not because it is just."
Chomsky: "I don't, personally, agree with that.
For example, if I could convince myself that attainment of power by the proletariat would lead to a terrorist police state, in which freedom and dignity and decent human relations would be destroyed, then I wouldn't want the proletariat to take power. In fact the only reason for wanting any such thing, I believe, is because one thinks, rightly or wrongly, that some fundamental human values will be achieved by that transfer of power...
"The use of violence and the creation of some degree of injustice can only be justified on the basis of the claim and the assessment-which always ought to be undertaken very, very seriously and with a good deal of scepticism that this violence is being exercised because a more just result is going to be achieved. If it does not have such a grounding, it is really totally immoral, in my opinion...
"The idea is-and for the reasons I mentioned I'm sceptical about it-that a period of violent dictatorship, or perhaps violent and bloody dictatorship, is justified because it will mean the submergence and termination of class oppression, a proper end to achieve in human life; it is because of that final qualification that the whole enterprise might be justified. Whether it is or not is another issue."
Foucault: "If you like, I will be a little bit Nietzsche-an about this; in other words, it seems to me that the idea of justice in itself is an idea which in effect has been invented and put to work in different types of societies as an instrument of a certain political and economic power or as a weapon against that power. But it seems to me that, in any case, the notion of justice itself functions within a society of classes as a claim made by the oppressed class and as justification for it... And in a classless society, I am not sure that we would still use this notion of justice."
Chomsky: "Well, here I really disagree. I think there is some sort of an absolute basis--if you press me too hard I'll be in trouble, because I can't sketch it out-ultimately residing in fundamental human qualities, in terms of which a "real" notion of justice is grounded.
I think it's too hasty to characterise our existing systems of justice as merely systems of class oppression; I don't think that they are that. I think that they embody systems of class oppression and elements of other kinds of oppression, but they also embody a kind of groping towards the true humanly, valuable concepts of justice and decency and love and kindness and sympathy, which I think are real...
"However, I think what you're describing only holds for a very different kind of situation... I mean, in a certain sense, abstracting away from a lot of historical problems, that's what faced the soldiers who were massacring each other in the trenches in the First World War. They were fighting for nothing. They were fighting for the right to destroy each other. And in that kind of circumstance no questions of justice arise... And in such a circumstance, the kind that you describe, where there is no question of justice, just the question of who's going to win a struggle to the death, then I think the proper human reaction is : call it off, don't win either way, try to stop it...
"But I don't think that's the typical situation in human affairs, and I don't think that's the situation in the case of class-conflict or social revolution. There I think that one can and must give an argument... that the social revolution that you're trying to achieve is in the ends of justice, is in the ends of realising fundamental human needs, not merely in the ends of putting some other group into power, because they want it."
Foucault: "I would simply say this, that finally this problem of human nature, when put simply in theoretical terms, hasn't led to an argument between us; ultimately we understand each other very well on these theoretical problems.
On the other hand, when we discussed the problem of human nature and political problems, then differences arose between us. And contrary to what you think, you can't prevent me from believing that these notions of human nature, of justice, of the realisation of the essence of human beings, are all notions and concepts which have been formed within our civilisation, within our type of knowledge and our form of philosophy, and that as a result form part of our class system; and one can't, however regrettable it may be, put forward these notions to describe or justify a fight which should-and shall in principle--overthrow the very fundamentals of our society. This is an extrapolation for which I can't find the historical justification."
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